Interpretação e análise do problema da indução sob uma visão fundamentada em teorias de conjuntos e teoria de probabilidades

Abstract

The following work is to interpret and analyze the problem of induction under a vision founded on set theory and probability theory as a basis for solution of its negative philosophical implications related to the systems of inductive logic in general. Due to the importance of the problem and the relatively recent developments in these fields of knowledge (early 20th century), as well as the visible relations between them and the process of inductive inference, it has been opened a field of relatively unexplored and promising possibilities. The key point of the study consists in modeling the information acquisition process using concepts of set theory, followed by a treatment using probability theory. Throughout the study it was identified as a major obstacle to the probabilistic justification, both: the problem of defining the concept of probability and that of rationality, as well as the subtle connection between the two. This finding called for a greater care in choosing the criterion of rationality to be considered in order to facilitate the treatment of the problem through such specific situations, but without losing their original characteristics so that the conclusions can be extended to classic cases such as the question about the continuity of the sunrise