A ilusão transcendental na crítica da Razão Pura: ponderações judicativas e hermenêuticas sobre a dinâmica ilusória da razão em seu uso puro e sua importância para o sistema críticotranscendental

Abstract

In the Critique of Pure Reason (KrV), especially in the opening of Transcendental Dialectic, Kant asserts that there is in human reason a "natural and inevitable illusion" that urges it to go beyond the limits of possible experience, taking subjective principles as objectives. This illusion is called "transcendental illusion" and is based on its dynamics pure reason. The present dissertation aims to discuss and elucidate this topic of Kantian theoretical philosophy, to describe its particularities, to contribute it in the critical-transcendental system, and, finally, to reveal its importance in this framework. For this goal, this work is divided into three main chapters, each endowed with subsections, in which the theme is discussed in detail. In the first chapter, called Prolegomena to the theme of transcendental illusion, it is considered the immediate intertext of this illusion, namely the Transcendental Dialectic, and why Kant understands this section of the KrV as "logic of illusion." In addition, a hermeneutic evaluation of Schein, a term designating the illusion, as well as the distinctions between the empirical, logical and transcendental illusion, made by Kant, is adduced. In the second chapter, titled The Transcendental Illusion in the Critique of Pure Reason (KrV), this theme is specifically approached from its definition and basic characterizations, going through a textual analysis about the nature and inevitability of this illusion, as well as its relation with ideas of reason. In the last chapter, named The epistemological importance of the transcendental illusion, it is sought to understand the relevance of this topic of Kantian critical-theoretical philosophy in epistemological terms. Thus, the positive and negative roles of the transcendental illusion are addressed and, finally, a heuristic solution is offered. This will deal with the details of this problem and will lead them to the constitutive formatting of the dynamics of reason, taking into account the roles previously highlighted in the epistemological field, without ceasing to offer justifications for the act of presiding over new knowledge and the eloquent inventive capacity of reason.