A garantia convencional ao (procedimento do) Tribunal do Júri e o projeto de lei do novo CPP: um conflito entre a razoável duração do processo e o devido processo legal

Abstract

The popular judgement, due to its typical complexities, has always been endowed with a special nature, which differentiates it from other criminal procedures. However, due to the social demand for its faster processing, based on the fundamental guarantee for a trial within a reasonable time, the Brazilian legislator sought to reformulate it. To that end, the substitute presented in 2021 by the Chamber of Deputies to the bill nº 8045, of 2010, proposed to extinguish the Jury’s current biphasic procedure. Therefore, this study analyzes, in detail, the procedural implications of the intended reform, under the light of the lessons arising from the transconstitutionalism and conventionality control. Given the relevance of the proposed amendment, which will affect the procedure of the judgment of crimes against life, this study aims to verify whether there was a conventional adaptation of the legislative proposal with the dictates of the American Convention on Human Rights and with the interpretations to what were conferred by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The research, which has an applied nature, has a qualitative and quantitative approach, since it uses the analysis of data collected on the procedures of the Brazilian Jury to address the need to impose the guarantee for a trial within a reasonable time as the foundation of the reform. For this purpose, bibliographical, statistical and documentary research was used, in an effort to further investigate the doctrinal and jurisprudential position regarding the issues raised here. In the end, it is concluded that the proposed new procedure violates the conventional – therefore supralegal – principles to the judicial hearing, the due process of law and the effective technical defense, since the suppression of the only moment able to produce evidence before the judgement of admissibility makes it completely unfeasible to instruct the case at this procedural stage, sending to the plenary a process devoid of the adequate archive of evidence. Finally, the need to strengthen the ideal of the constitutional criminal procedure was pointed out, with the elevation of the Jury procedure to the status of fundamental guarantee. Furthermore, legal changes were suggested which, by giving the trial a new reasonable time, would not make the procedural principles listed above unworkable, maintaining the Jury as the representative of the democracy ideal that is its own.