Sustentabilidade em ribeirinhos: como os jogos econômicos podem ajudar a compreender o comportamento social por trás do desenvolvimento sustentável

Abstract

Cooperation is a central feature of human societies. It occurs when an individual has a cost for another individual to receive a benefit. Costs and benefits are measured in terms of fitness. In a population of cooperators, defecting individuals have a higher average fitness than cooperating individuals. However, in a competitive context, populations of cooperators may have a greater fitness than populations of selfish individuals. Adaptive mechanisms can contribute to the evolution and maintenance of cooperation, such as Kin Selection and Direct Reciprocity. To maximize their gains, individuals can use a public good without contributing to its maintenance, but it will increase the costs for other individuals, thus constituting a social dilemma. One way to study sustainable social dilemmas is through economic games. The aim of this work is to investigate cooperation mechanisms that regulate common goods use in communities from a sustainable development reserve. The Ultimatum Game, Dictator Game, Gift Game, Public Goods Game and Third-part punishment game were used to assess cooperation and resource management. A questionnaire on day-to-day cooperation and a norm conformity scale were also carried out. Furthermore, situations that facilitate the management of natural resources in a sustainable way will be observed, such as adherence to the fishing agreements norms. We investigated whether cooperation strategies vary according to the degree of kinship, level of interaction and reputation within the group. Our results showed that kinship is the most influential cooperative mechanism within this population, that direct reciprocity is present in everyday interactions, a good reputation favors gains within the group and a low relationship between cooperation in games and conformity to norms. From these findings, a long-term cooperation plan in a more sustainable system can be proposed, overcoming some cooperation dilemmas.