A relação executivo-legislativo no estado da Paraíba: o controle da agenda da Lei Orçamentária - 2011-2014

Abstract

The theme of this dissertation refers to the role of the Legislative Power in the lawmaking process. Such a discussion brings in the relationship between the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch which revolves around the strong predominance of governors over assemblies within the scope of state policy in Brazil. The main hypothesis here is that in this relationship the Executive, due to its agenda-setting in the lawmaking process, would exercise predominance over the Legislative, while the deputies would present a low degree of participation in the decision making process. Based on a case study, and having as an empirical reference the Legislative Assembly of Paraiba (LAPB), specifically the work within the Committee on Monitoring and Control of Budget Execution in the period between 2011- 2014, this research sought to analyze the parliamentarians’ behavior before the Executive and the difficulties of this Power to approve the Annual Budget Laws (in the Portuguese acronym, LOAS) in a context dominated by the opposition in the Assembly. The evidence presented in the research indicates that, in spite of the constitutional prerogatives of the Executive which favors the approval of its legislative agenda, the LAPB parliamentarians within the Commission of Monitoring and Control of the Budget Execution presented a significant degree of participation, especially in view of the approval of the parliamentary amendments to the Annual Budget Laws sent annually by the Executive. This finding contradicts the current hypothesis in the specialized literature, which suggests a low degree of participation of these deputies in the lawmaking process. In what concerns the hypothesis related to difficulties of the Executive Power in approving its bills before an opposition-dominated Assembly, this research demonstrated that the governor used two strategies: by means of the institutional route, he created the "Social Pact for Paraiba" which enabled the direct access to mayors; and the "Democratic Participatory Budget” which provided direct access to the population and grassroots leaders of each municipality. From the analytical point of view, the evidence suggests a rich mosaic of Executive/Legislative relations in the state decision-making system, pointing to the need for a future research agenda which can account for the variations and diversity of state political systems in Brazil.