Deus e o problema lógico do mal: um estudo da proposta lógico-modal de Alvin Plantinga

Abstract

One of the main arguments used against theism – the belief in a perfectly powerful and good God – is the so-called problem of evil. Over the centuries, philosophers exposed the problem in multiple ways, but no definitive logical solution could be reached. Recently, a discussion has been reignited within contemporary analytic philosophy. In the 1970s, the most formidable candidate for the “ultimate logical solution” in favor of theism emerged – namely, Alvin Plantinga's modal-logic proposal, known as the “Free will Defense”, according to which it is possible to demonstrate the logical compatibility between God and evil. If these two elements can be shown to logically coexist, then the problem of evil, at least its logical version, dissolves and the theistic concept of God becomes immune to this kind of objection. It should be noted that, although Plantinga's proposal did not have the same theological pretensions as the traditional Augustinian theodicy, for example, it is also based on free will as an essential component in solving the logical problem of evil. Indeed, Plantinga's proposal does not constitute a theodicy – it is not intended to discover God's reason for permitting evil and justifying it. His argument is restricted to the satisfaction of criteria of formal logic. It is the general objective of this research to investigate the logical problem of evil, as stated and defended by its main exponents, and to inquire Plantinga's answer to it. And, since Plantinga's proposal is quite complex – mainly due to the sophisticated use of modal logic and the semantics of possible worlds –, there is, whenever possible, an effort towards clarify the terminology. This research will address the topic as follows. First, a brief history of the discussion of evil is provided, and some preliminary definitions are given. Then, Plantinga's answer to the logical problem of evil is presented, in two parts: (1) his commitments to demonstrate that “the charge of inconsistency”, leveled against theism, is false; and (2) his defense that the theistic conception of God is, in fact, logically consistent with the presence of evil in the world. Finally, a brief evaluation of the presented topics. This research values the hermeneutic, descriptive and analytical elements and does not intend to be exhaustive.