Schopenhauer e o significado metafísico do tédio

Abstract

This dissertation presents Arthur Schopenhauer's perspective on boredom, aiming to argue for the presence of a metaphysical meaning of boredom in human existence, grounded in Schopenhauer's metaphysics of the will, which is, existence is essentially an insatiable will, devoid of intrinsic value. The investigation begins with a chapter introducing the epistemology of “representation” and the metaphysics of “will” that form the basis of the “single thought” through which the philosopher explains boredom. In this first stage, we address the “endless striving” that constitutes human essence and the “insatiable” nature of its willing. In the second chapter, we present a concept of boredom based on the notion of “sensation” and the “law of motivation,” followed by a discussion aimed at comprehend the “pain of boredom” to which the philosopher refers in passages describing the affective state of the bored individual. One of the problems to be resolved is the incompatibility between the emptiness of motives that arouses boredom and the volitional essence of the human being, whose existence consists of the effective affirmation of its insatiable will, motivated by objects supplied by its intellect. How can we reconcile a will that cannot help but will, whose entire being and existence is mere manifestation of this willing, with an actual experience of a lack of determined willing? This question is answered by interpreting boredom as a “will to will”; that is, in boredom, the will persists in “wanting to want,” its volitive nature remaining intact. Finally, in the third chapter, the dissertation explains how boredom is an experience that attests, firstly the metaphysical reality of an insatiable will whose essence is only striving, and secondly how boredom reveals the emptiness of value of human existence. Lastly, it demonstrates how this metaphysical meaning leads to Schopenhauer's pessimism.