Efeitos da atuação política dos governadores dos estados brasileiros na captação de transferências voluntárias

Abstract

This study analyzes the effects of governors' political actions on securing voluntary transfers from the Union's budget to the Federated States, emphasizing their career experience and political dynamics with the actors involved in approving the Brazilians Annual Budget Law (Lei Orçamentária Anual). Considering that discretionary transfers are essential for implementing public policies of mutual interest, this research provides insights into whether agents with different levels of articulation and experience have similar capacities to secure resources allocated to government policies. The study contributes to the literature by analyzing how governors' political actions influence power dynamics, public management, and the distribution of resources within Brazilian federalism. While much of the existing literature focuses on transfers directed to municipalities, this work emphasizes governors' political roles in securing voluntary transfers for states, addressing a significant gap in the understanding of intergovernmental relations and the functioning of federalism in Brazil. To achieve this objective, panel data regression was employed, covering the period from 2011 to 2023, considering the superior quality of the data from the Superior Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral - TSE) database. Additionally, data from the Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning (Cebrap) were used to quantify attributes related to political alignment. The results contribute to a deeper understanding of the interaction between fiscal federalism and political dynamics in Brazil, enabling analyses of the potential impact of political leaders with consolidated trajectories compared to those emerging as new actors in the political arena. Parliamentary representation in the Deputies Chamber (Câmara dos Deputados) is positively associated with the transfers received, highlighting its relevance as a bargaining element. However, political alignment with other institutional actors, such as the President of the Republic and the Budget General Rapporteur, and the governors' political experience were not significant, indicating the possible protagonism of the parliament in the analyzed context. Thus, the findings demonstrate that the distribution of transfers more intensely reflects parliamentary interests, contributing to the understanding of power relations in Brazilian fiscal federalism.