Relação dos mecanismos de governança com o desempenho das companhias brasileiras: evidências à luz das teorias da agência e sinalização

Abstract

In the light of agency theory and signaling theory, this study aims to investigate if there is a relationship between the adoption of corporate governance mechanisms and the performance of companies listed on B3. For this, information was collected from the reference forms, bylaws, and press releases about the corporate governance structure of 227 non-financial companies. The information necessary for the estimation of performance, which in the case of the present study, was measured by Tobin's Q and ROA and, alternatively, by market value and ROE, as well as the control variables inserted in the econometric model, were obtained through the Thomson Reuters Refinitiv Eikon® database, covering the period from 2010 to 2019. The descriptive results showed that the boards of directors are composed about 73,5% of independent members, giving the possibility of more efficient monitoring of the management. In addition, the percentage of women’s participation in the board, although incipient, shows a slight increase over the period investigated. Based on the results obtained from the estimation of ordinary least squares (OLS) models with an unbalanced panel data arrangement, it was found that the presence of women on the boards, voluntary disclosure and listing at Level 2 and New Market levels of corporate governance are positively related to operational performance, and the size of the boards has a negative relationship. In the case of market performance, in addition to the mechanisms related to operational performance, the presence of independent members on the board and the adoption of anti-takeover defenses are added in a positive relationship, and shareholder concentration and CEO duality are negatively related. In an additional analysis, it was also possible to verify that governance mechanisms are related to higher analysts' evaluations. The results showed that, for an environment of informational asymmetries, corporate governance mechanisms work as signals to the market. The increase in information provided by these mechanisms can directly impact the reduction of agency costs and, therefore, increase its performance.