O presidencialismo de coalizão diante do patrimonialismo e do contrato social da redemocratização

Abstract

The purpose of this Dissertation is to analyze coalitional presidentialism in view of to promoting stability or instability in the decision-making process or in the implementation of the political agenda. The discussion around the research on coalitional presidentialism and the main arguments concerning this issue is confronted with the social and economic progress made after the promulgation of the Constitution of 1988. These important social and economic advances are an expression of the social contract of redemocratization, whose initial term was established by the 1988 Constitution and increased, with greater or less emphasis, by governments, based on the rules of the set of social, political and economic institutions. The advances achieved in the context of coalitional presidentialism did not occur without ideological, legal and political barriers having to be overcome. Among these obstacles stand out patrimonialist practices, with a long tradition in Brazil. Patrimonialism is a concept that maintains its strength, validity and operational effectiveness and, therefore, can be contemporaneously confronted with the potential for governance under the coalitional presidentialism. From this it follows that political and economic institutions can be analyzed from the perspective of patrimonialism as a starting point for determining the degree of social inclusion that these same institutions can promote. This research considers the institutional design perspective of coalitional presidentialism, notably the decision-making process and not only its formal and legal framework, and confronts the mechanics of coalitional presidentialism with the impeachment process of President Dilma Rousseff. The governance category is instrumentalized to analyze how the Executive, the Legislative and the parties are constituted as decisive political actors in the process of forming the coalition and exerting influence in the political arena. It is not possible to say that coalitional presidentialism degrades democracy and contributes to the depredation of citizenship by public and private actors. Coalitional presidentialism promotes the sharing of power between the Executive, the Legislative, other political bodies and organized civil society, admits the mediating role of the Judiciary, makes possible mechanisms to avoid the dominance of the Executive and is endowed with mechanisms capable of generating conditions for the increase of the contract social of redemocratization and for the improvement of inclusive political and economic institutions.