O real e o conhecimento

Abstract

The present work aims to analyze the general nature of the relation between knowledge and its object, taken in the most comprehensive meaning, as well as to understand how the manner we approach the distinction between both entails consequences for the areas of epistemology and metaphysics. We will seek to touch on this question by the comparative study of the philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Bernard Lonergan and by the examination of the human cognitive structure. More specifically, four problems constitute the spine of this dissertation: (1º) whether the structure of human knowledge reflects or not the structure of known reality; (2º) whether the solutions or choices adopted in the context of the former question result in palpable consequences for ontology and scientific method; (3º) whether the point of view of common sense, according to which we in fact possess a knowledge of reality or of the world, not limited to our own thought constructions, even if imperfect or partial, is defensible; (4º) whether, by investigating this theme, some lead for the solution of the universals problem could be found.