A concepção de dignidade da pessoa humana em Boécio

Abstract

Boethius' thought is widely associated with a eudaimonistic ethics. Although his contributions span various fields of knowledge, including notions of freedom and virtue, the practical dimension of his studies always converges on issues related to happiness, especially in his work The Consolation of Philosophy. Positioned between the legacy of classical tradition and medieval thought, Boethius developed a conception of dignity influenced by historical, philosophical, semantic, and theological contexts, in a period of political and religious tensions in Italy under the reign of Theodoric. Thus, this dissertation investigates Boethius' thought, highlighting his role in shaping the notion of human dignity and analyzing how his ideas contributed to the development of this concept, transcending its restricted use in defining personhood and exploring its relevance to legal philosophy. The research adopts a multifaceted approach, integrating historical, philosophical, semantic, and theological perspectives. The study is structured around four main axes: first, the historical-political context of Boethius and its influence on the concept of dignity; second, his classical definition of personhood; third, the semantic meaning of the term and its relation to the concept of happiness; and finally, the theological dimension, addressing the integration between faith and reason. The dissertation reveals that Boethius developed a unique conception of dignity, linking it to rationality, autonomy, and the relationship with God. His definition of person as an "individual substance of a rational nature," previously seen as his sole connection to the theme, was expanded to an understanding of dignity as inherent to the human condition, transcending social status and aligning with the pursuit of the supreme good. The study asserts that, although Boethius is not traditionally recognized as one of the formulators of the concept of human dignity, his reflections provided significant philosophical foundations for the development of this idea, which would later be regarded as a principle, particularly in Western legal philosophy. His contribution remains relevant today, reinforcing dignity as an essential, inalienable, and universal attribute of the human being.