Michael Sandel e a ética do aprimoramento genético humano

Abstract

The aim of this work is to analyze the criticism that the American philosopher Michael Sandel directs to the techniques of human genetic enhancement, in order to compare it with the author’s broader work. Based on this, we hope to show some nuances of the more social aspect of Sandel’s argument, ignored by many of his readers, as well as to point out the limits of his criticism, suggesting both that he assumes some premisses that are not free from contestation and that other parts of his writings offer elements that make the author’s rejection of genetic enhancements less radical than it might seem at first glance. In order to do so, we begin with a very brief description of the technological and philosophical scenario in which the debate on human genetic enhancement takes place (introduction), a description that we must narrow and deepen in the first chapter, when dealing with the theme of liberal eugenics. We continue, in the second chapter, with a brief assessment of the criticism directed against this movement by the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas. In the third chapter, when we finally get to know Michael Sandel's critique of human genetic enhancement, we will make an incursion into his broader ideas about politics, in order to provide a background capable of lending more strength to his bioethical position. In the fourth chapter we outline our criticism of this author, which we believe is capable of weakening the reliability and supposed inevitability of the scenario he draws for a future of enhanced people. Finally, in our fifth and final chapter, we describe what, in our opinion, is the main risk of enhancements, contrasting it with those pointed out by Sandel, risks that, although do not make the more general idea of genetic enhancements unfeasible, require special care about its distribution.