Tributos indiretos na cadeia produtiva do camarão

Abstract

The state of Rio Grande do Norte counts with a relevant potential in the shrimp farming supply chain. In the larviculture step the state responds for more than half of the national production. In the farming step it is the second largest producer. In the industrial step, its industries have almost 40% of the shrimp processing capacity of the northeast of Brazil. However, this country has the highest tax rate comparing with the main shrimp producer countries. Considering the influence of taxes in the competition among companies, the main goal of this research is to analyze the impact of indirect taxes in the above steps of the supply chain. To achieve it, it will be used the data of the 2011 Census of the Shrimp Farming and it will be applied the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to identify the market form of those steps. In order to contribute with the characterization of the supply chain, CEO´s of farms and industries will be interviewed. The price-elasticity of the shrimp larvae, the in natura shrimp and the processed shrimp will be analyzed in order to verify the possibility that each one of those three steps has to pass-through the onus of the end of benefit over the ICMS. The data analysis shows that the larviculture step functions as a duopoly and, facing the end of that benefit, it will be able to pass-through most its onus to the farming step. On the other hand, this step functions similar to a perfect competing market, which diminishes its capacity to pass-through that onus to the processing step. This step operates as oligopoly with a lower concentration than the larviculture step but, due to the fact that it faces an oligopsony, it will end up assuming most of that onus, which will cause a decrease in the amount of processed shrimp. It is concluded that the end of that benefit would impact negatively, in this state, the supply chain at all, but mainly the farming and the industrial steps