Concorrência em bits: proteção de dados como um incentivo a concorrência no mercado digital

Abstract

Competition in the digital markets is marked by challenges due to gaps in the legislation, which is based on classical market theory. Thus, in general, the mergers practiced by large technology companies are not subject to the criteria for analyzing abuse of economic power, so that these companies are able to achieve dominant positions of power and suppress competition. Based on this premise, by verifying how the digital market is regulated abroad and in Brazil and what gaps still exist, it is intended to demonstrate how modern data protection laws can encourage competition in the digital market, in addition to highlighting situations in which it has already been used for this purpose. To this end, an exploratory, bibliographical, legislative and doctrinal research on competition in the digital market and data protection was used. In the end, it has been concluded that data protection laws provide ample incentive for competition in the digital market, for example through the use of data portability, as long as a culture of data protection is implemented and data protection be more profitable than violation.